Strategies and Games, second edition: Theory and Practice

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Description

The new edition of a widely used introduction to game theory and its applications, with a focus on economics, business, and politics.This widely used introduction to game theory is rigorous but accessible, unique in its balance between the theoretical and the practical, with examples and applications following almost every theory-driven chapter. In recent years, game theory has become an important methodological tool for all fields of social sciences, biology and computer science. This second edition of Strategies and Games not only takes into account new game theoretical concepts and applications such as bargaining and matching, it also provides an array of chapters on game theory applied to the political arena. New examples, case studies, and applications relevant to a wide range of behavioral disciplines are now included. The authors map out alternate pathways through the book for instructors in economics, business, and political science. The book contains four parts: strategic form games, extensive form games, asymmetric information games, and cooperative games and matching. Theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, Condorcet paradox, backward induction, subgame perfection, repeated and dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, signaling, the Shapley value, and stable matchings. Applications and case studies include OPEC, voting, poison pills, Treasury auctions, trade agreements, pork-barrel spending, climate change, bargaining and audience costs, markets for lemons, and school choice. Each chapter includes concept checks and tallies end-of-chapter problems. An appendix offers a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, which underpins game theory.

Additional information

Weight 7.4 kg
Dimensions 3.71 × 21.11 × 23.65 cm
PubliCanadation City/Country

USA

by

,

format

Language

Pages

712

publisher

Year Published

2022-8-9

Imprint

ISBN 10

0262046520

About The Author

Prajit K. Dutta is Professor in the Department of Economics at Columbia University. Wouter Vergote is Associate Professor of Economics at the ESCP Business School, Madrid Campus.

Table Of Content

Preface xxiiiPart One Introductions 1Chapter 1 A First Look at the Applications 3Chapter 2 A First Look at the Theory 21Part Two Strategic Form Games: Theory and Practice 39Chapter 3 Strategic Form Games and Dominant Strategies 41Chapter 4 Dominance Solvability 57Chapter 5 Nash Equilibrium 75Chapter 6 An Application: Cournot Duopoly 89Chapter 7 Voting and Elections 107Chapter 8 An Application: The Commons Problem 125Chapter 9 Mixed Strategies 139Chapter 10 Two Applications: Natural Monopoly and Bankruptcy Law 161Chapter 11 Zero-Sum Games 179Part Three Extensive Form Games: Theory and Applications 199Chapter 12 Extensive Form Games and Backward Induction 201Chapter 13 An Application: Research and Development 225Chapter 14 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 239Chapter 15 Fintely Repeated Games 257Chapter 16 Infinitely Repeated Games 277Chapter 17 An Application: Competition and Collusion in the NASDAQ Stock Market 295Chapter 18 An Application OPEC 309Chapter 19 An Application: Logrolling and Pork-Barrel Spending 329Chapter 20 An Application: Trade Agreements 345Chapter 21 Dynamic Games with an Application to Global Warming 363Chapter 22 Strategic Bargaining 385Part Four Asymmetric Information Games: Theory and Applications 403Chapter 23 Moral Hazard and Incentives Theory 405Chapter 24 Games with Incomplete Information 423Chapter 25 Mechanism Design, The Revelation Principle, and Sales to an Unknown Buyer 447Chapter 26 An Application: Auctions 465Chapter 27 An Application: Price Competition with Cost Uncertainty 481Chapter 28 Signaling Games and the Lemons Problem 501Chapter 29 An Application: Crisis Bargaining and Escalation 521Part Five Cooperative Games and Matching 541Chapter 30 Cooperative Games 543Chapter 31 Matching Problems 567Part Six Foundations 593Chapter 32 Calculus and Optimization 595Chapter 33 Probability and Expectation 613Chapter 34 Utility and Expected Utility 625Chapter 35 Existence of Nash Equilbria 641Index 655

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